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II. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
The statutory provision that confers jurisdiction on the appellate court is 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(j); and Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Section 3. 
III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
Issue No. 1: Did the district court err by ignoring all the issues raised by the 
defense but granting Appellee On/is' motion for summary 
judgment on the sole ground of the voidability of the 
assignments to and from the expired LLC, and where the 
defenses duly raised below by Appellant raised genuine and 
material factual issues that must be tried, thus, precluding 
summary judgment, as a matter of law, and where every one 
of the defenses raised is material because the outcome of this 
case is affected by a decision on any one of those issues? 
Applicable standard of appellate review, with supporting 
authority. "When reviewing a court's decision to grant 
summary judgment, we examine the court's legal conclusions 
for correctness." Young v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist, 2002 UT 
64, If 10, 52 P.3d 1230 (quoting Tustian v. Schriever, 2001 UT 
84,H13, 34 P.3d 755). 
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Issue No. 2: Is it a material issue of fact precluding summary judgment 
below that Jayson Orvis was a partner with Appellant and 
DaNell Johnson and, in conspiracy with their attorney Victor 
Lawrence, violated partner and attorney fiduciary duty to 
Appellant by acquiring the Belding Judgment, to extinguish the 
partnership, and mask fraud on Appellant, and voiding the 
judgment in the hands of Appellee Orvis, as a matter of public 
policy and law? 
This issue was preserved below. [Record p. 13, fl 13] 
Applicable standard of appellate review, with supporting 
authority. "When reviewing a court's decision to grant 
summary judgment, we examine the court's legal conclusions 
for correctness." Young v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist, 2002 UT 
64, H 10, 52 P.3d 1230 (quoting Tustian v. Schriever, 2001 UT 
84, If 13, 34P.3d755). 
Issue No. 3: Is it a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary 
judgment below that Orvis used partnership monies 
misappropriated from the Orvis-Johnson partnership to acquire 
the Belding judgment and thus the judgment is owned and is 
the property of the Orvis-Johnson partnership and not of Orvis 
individually, and because the judgment is otherwise expired, 
and the right party has not filed a complaint to extend the 
judgment, the complaint of Appellee Orvis must be dismissed? 
This issue was preserved below: [Record p.11, fl 13] 
Applicable standard of appellate review, with supporting 
authority. "When reviewing a court's decision to grant 
summary judgment, we examine the court's legal conclusions 
for correctness." Young v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist, 2002 UT 
64, fl 10, 52 P.3d 1230 (quoting Tustian v. Schriever, 2001 UT 
84,1[13, 34P.3d755). 
Issue No. 4: Is it a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary 
judgment below that the judgment is satisfied and of no further 
force and effect because Orvis has withheld at least $1.5 
Million in partnership profit share from Johnsons by use of the 
judgment and otherwise? 
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This issue was preserved below: [Record p. 10, fl 12] 
Applicable standard of appellate review, with supporting 
authority. "When reviewing a court's decision to grant 
summary judgment, we examine the court's legal conclusions 
for correctness." Young v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist, 2002 UT 
64, H 10, 52 P.3d 1230 (quoting Tustian v. Schriever, 2001 UT 
84,^13, 34 P.3d 755). 
Issue No. 5: Did the district court abuse it discretion in denying Appellant's 
Motion To Strike when Orvis filed a pleading and affidavit 
wholly irrelevant and unresponsive to any issues in the case; 
that was false; and that was filed for, what Orvis and counsel 
admitted was for a malicious and immaterial purpose to malign 
Appellant and also Appellant's family? 
This issue was preserved below: [Record pp. 580-581 and p. 
1114, transcript p. 24] 
Applicable standard of appellate review, with supporting 
authority. The standard of review is whether the judge abused 
its discretion in allowing wholly irrelevant, false, outrageously 
defamatory, inadmissible, and illegal evidence. State v. 
Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, H 16, 6 P.3d 1120 (quoting 
State v. DeCorso, 1999 UT 57, fl 18, 993 P.2d 837). 
Issue No. 6: Did the district court err and abuse its discretion in denying 
Appellant's motion for Rule 11 sanctions against Appellant and 
counsel for filing the malicious affidavit and pleading for a 
malicious purpose, for hiring an unlicensed private detective 
who, among other things, conversed with Appellant's minor 
children, in violation of Utah criminal law, and, who, when 
receiving notice that their use of the unlicensed detective and 
his surveillance of the minor children, and the false affidavit 
were in violation of Utah criminal law, and upon receiving 
request for assistance to rectify this violation of law and to 
comply with the said law, failed and refused to take any steps 
or admit violation of law until after a hearing wherein in the 
wrongful and malicious affidavit was relied on by counsel and 
the court? 
This issue was preserved below: [Record pp. 958,1017, 
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1052,1J4 and pp. 1067-1068] 
Applicable standard of appellate review, with supporting 
authority. The standard of review is whether the judge abused 
its discretion First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Schamanek, 684 
P.2d 1257, 1266 (Utah 1984). Cited with approval in Wright v. 
Wrights, 941 P.2d 646 (Utah App. 07/03/1997). 
Issue No. 7: Did the district court abuse it's discretion when, in granting a 
protective order in favor of Appellee Orvis below, the court 
awarded attorney fees to Orvis as a monetary sanction against 
Appellant for too short a notice for setting depositions, when 
the actual dates and notices and parties for depositions were 
the same as actually and already set by Orvis and then 
Appellant in two of the other five cases brought by Orvis 
against Appellant and his family, and Orvis had more than ten 
days notice of the dates and persons; and there was evidence 
presented that there was an urgency to hold such discovery 
because parties were going to be unavailable? 
This issue was preserved below: [Record p. 1113, transcript 
p. 6] 
Applicable standard of appellate review, with supporting 
authority. The standard of review is whether the judge abused 
its discretion First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Schamanek, 684 
P.2d 1257, 1266 (Utah 1984). Cited with approval in Wright v. 
Wrights, 941 P.2d 646 (Utah App. 07/03/1997). 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE: 
Orvis purchased a judgment against Appellant and he filed a complaint 
below in an attempt to renew and extend the soon-to-expire judgment. This was 
done preparatory to using the judgment offensively against Appellant Johnson to 
extinguish Johnson's partnership with Orvis and conceal misappropriated 
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partnership funds. Appellant defended against Orvis' acquisition and possession 
of the judgment, and Johnson also counterclaimed against Orvis, who is 
Johnson's partner, for defrauding Johnson and using embezzled partnership 
money to acquire the judgment, in violation of partner and lawyer fiduciary duty. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE: 
This is an appeal from the grant of summary judgment below. The case 
proceeded thusly. 
June 6, 2002: Appellee Orvis filed the complaint to renew and extend a 
soon-to-expire judgment that he had purchased against Appellant. 
July 15, 2002: Appellant answered and counterclaimed. In said answer, 
appellant raised numerous affirmative defenses to the complaint of Appellee. 
March 26, 2004: Appellee Orvis moved for summary judgment to renew 
the judgment. 
June 1, 2004: Appellant Johnson filed a Memorandum and an Affidavit 
with exhibits in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment. 
June 9, 2004: Orvis filed a Reply and supporting Affidavit of unlicensed 
detective, Crawley. 
June 22, 2004: Appellant filed a Motion to Strike the reply of Orvis and the 
supporting Crawley affidavit. 
June 23, 2004: Appellee filed his opposition to the Motion To Strike (which 
included the offending statements referenced below, and which are part of the 
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Rule 11 sanctions.) 
October 26, 2004: The court granted Orvis' Motion for Summary Judgment 
and denied Appellant's Motion To Strike. 
November 24, 2004: Appellant filed a Motion for Rule 11 sanctions against 
Orvis and counsel. 
April 29, 2005: The district court executed the order denying the motion for 
sanctions. 
V. FACTS 
BELDING JUDGMENT ACQUIRED 
1. Mr. Orvis purchased a judgment (the "Belding Judgment") against Mr. 
Johnson, in August of 2001. [Record p.2 U 9] 
2. The Belding judgment was originally entered against Mr. Johnson on 
April 5, 1995. [Record p. 2 fl 7] 
3. Action on a Utah judgment is barred after eight years. (Utah Code § 78-
12-22) [Record p. 98 U 4] 
4. As of April 5, 2003, any action on the Belding judgment would be barred 
by the statute of limitations, unless this action is successfully maintained and the 
judgment renewed and extended by Mr. Orvis. [Record p. 98 ^ 5] 
COMPLAINT AGAINST MR. JOHNSON 
5. Mr. Orvis, on June 1, 2002, filed the Complaint herein (one of five 
complaints he has filed against Appellant Johnson) in Third District Court, below, 
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to renew the Belding Judgment before the eight year statute ran out. But for that, 
the Belding Judgment is otherwise expired. [Record p. 98 U 6] 
6. Mr. Orvis used a dissolved LLC to acquire the Belding Judgment 
(discussed infra) which lacked the power under Utah law to accept the 
assignment of the Belding judgment and to re-assign it the next day to Mr. Orvis, 
and thus Orvis does not validly possess the Belding judgment. [Record p. 98 U 7] 
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM 
7. Mr. Johnson filed an Answer and Counterclaim to the Complaint 
asserting by way of affirmative defenses and by way of counterclaims that: 
[Record p. 9] 
a. Mr. Orvis is in a longstanding and well documented 
partnership with Mr. Johnson and/or with DaNell Johnson, Appellant's wife 
[Record pp. 12-13]; 
b. Mr. Orvis has embezzled money from the partnership and has 
used those funds improperly to, among other things, buy this Belding judgment. 
Therefore, the Belding judgment is property of the partnership whose money was 
used to purchase it, and the judgment is not the property of Mr. Orvis, and so 
Orvis cannot maintain this action [Record p. 11 U's13 & 14 pp.15 &16]; 
c. Mr. Orvis is part, operator, de facto owner, and alter ego of a 
law firm with, a Utah Attorney, Victor Lawrence [Record p.98 U 8c]; 
d. Said Utah Attorney was also the attorney for DaNell Johnson 
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and also for Mr. Johnson [Record p. 13 fl 12]; 
e. Mr. Orvis and said Utah attorney conspired to acquire this 
Belding judgment to fraudulently acquire the interest and cash flow of Mr. 
Johnson and DaNell Johnson, who are Orvis partners and former Lawrence 
clients, and to conceal the embezzlement and fraud of Mr. Orvis and Lawrence; 
and as such, the acquisition of the Belding judgment by a Utah attorney and 
partner Orvis, are unlawful, a fraud on Mr. Johnson, and is against public policy 
[Record p. 11 U's 14 and 17]; 
f. Appellant Johnson seeks an accounting for embezzled 
partnership funds and for establishing punitive damages [Record p. 14]; 
g. There is a complete offset to the Belding judgment because 
Orvis has withheld over $1.5 million of profit share owed to the Johnsons; and 
h. The Belding judgment was not validly assigned to Mr. 
Orvis. [Record p. 14, f s 18-19] 
8. Mr. Orvis moved for summary judgment to renew said Belding judgment 
and Mr. Johnson opposed said motion for the reasons set forth herein below that 
outline the business relation of the parties and the fraud of Orvis. [Record pp. 29-
31 and 97-110] 
HISTORY OF PARTNERSHIP 
9. Mr. Orvis, Mr. and Mrs. Johnson, and three others founded a partnership 
to perform "credit repair". This partnership formed various business entities and 
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various partners operated the entities. There is extensive documentary evidence 
of this partnership arrangement. [Record p. 98 fl 5 through p. 101 fl 14] 
10. Three of the partners departed, for one reason or another, leaving only 
Mr. Orvis and the Johnsons by fall of 1997. (The remaining partnership involving 
Orvis and Johnsons is referred to herein as the "Orvis-Johnson Partnership".) 
Mr. Johnson and DaNell Johnson, wife of Mr. Johnson, held this venture in an 
arrangement similar to prior ventures between them. [Record p. 99 fl 11] 
11. The Orvis-Johnson partnership continued for several years to divide 
monthly profit share. [Record p. 99 fl 12] 
12. There is extensive evidence of the Orvis-Johnson partnership including 
written agreements, profit share accounting, correspondence, division of 
partnership profits, course of performance, deposition testimony in various of the 
numerous lawsuits instigated by Orvis against the Johnsons. [Record p. 100 U 13] 
13. Appellant Johnson would learn, and depositions of third parties and 
discovery would demonstrate, that Orvis was embezzling from the Orvis-Johnson 
partnership. This is evidenced by, among other things, the following: 
a. Mr. Orvis was misrepresenting the actual amount of revenue 
coming into the Orvis-Johnson partnership. Attached to the Johnson Affidavit 
opposing summary judgment [Record page 111 et seq.] in the District Court case 
below as Exhibit "6" [Record p. 148] are Excerpts of Deposition of Tommy 
Triplett, assistant to Jayson Orvis, See pages 19-20 and 28 thereof [Record pp. 
12 
167-168 and 176]; and Exhibit "7" [Record p. 228] which is Excerpts of Deposition 
of Will Vigil, employee of Victor Lawrence, See pages 33, 37-38, and 68. 
[Record pp. 261, 265-266 and 296] 
b. Mr. Orvis was setting up secret companies to divert money 
away from the Orvis-Johnson partnership. (Attached to said Johnson Affidavit 
[Record p. 111 et seq.] below as Exhibit 6 Triplett Depo. Infra, p. 25, 31, and 41 
[Record pp. 173, 179 and 189], and Exhibit 7 Vigil Depo. Infra, pp. 63 and 106 
[Record pp. 291 and 334]) 
c. Orvis was conspiring with others to cut Johnsons out of the 
partnership. (Attached to said Johnson Affidavit below [Record p. 111] as Exhibit 
8, Deposition of Jade Griffen, See page 34.) [Record p. 407]. 
14. On August 16, 2001, Appellant Johnson sent to Orvis a demand for an 
accounting from Orvis. (See demand for accounting from Johnson to Orvis, 
dated August 16, 2001 attached as Exhibit 9 to Johnson Affidavit below.) [Record 
p. 417] 
15. To avoid an accounting which would have revealed his ongoing 
embezzlement, Orvis in August 2001, in conspiracy with attorney Lawrence 
surreptitiously acquired judgments (the Belding judgment and an SBA judgment) 
against Mr. Johnson and summoned Johnson to the office of attorney Dan 
Berman, where Berman announced that Mr. Orvis and Mr. Lawrence had 
obtained the judgments against Johnson in order to extinguish the Orvis-Johnson 
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partnership. Attorney Berman further told Appellant Johnson that Johnson had 
been sued by Orvis that day, August 30, 2001, and should settle or it would cost 
the Johnsons $300,000 to fight the lawsuit. (See letter of Appellant Johnson to 
Attorney Berman dated August 30, 2001, attached as Exhibit 10 to Johnson 
Affidavit below.) That initial case is before Third District Judge Timothy Hanson, 
Civil No. 010907449. [Record p. 102 U 16] 
SHAM DISSOLVED LLC 
16. When Mr. Orvis purchased the Belding judgment, he used as a "front" a 
dissolved Utah limited liability company, All Star Financial, LLC, ("All Star, LLC") 
whose sole member was Mark Kemp. [Record p. 102 fl 18] 
17. All Star, LLC was in an administratively dissolved status with the State 
of Utah as of July 3, 2001, approximately 50 days before Mr. Orvis used it to 
acquire the Belding Judgment. [Record p. 102 If 19.] 
18. On August 10, 2001, while dissolved and lacking capacity, All Star, LLC 
allegedly received an assignment of the Belding Judgment. (Exhibit 11, 
Assignment of Belding to All Star, LLC dated August 23, 2001 attached to the 
Johnson Affidavit below.) [Record p. 102 ^ 20] Said assignment was not for the 
purpose of winding up its affairs. 
19. Within 24 hours thereafter, All Star, LLC assigned the judgment to Mr. 
Orvis. (Exhibit 12, Assignment of All Star, LLC to Orvis dated August 24, 2001 
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attached to Johnson Affidavit below.) [Record p. 102 fl 21] Said assignment was 
not for the purpose of winding up its affairs. 
20. Mr. Orvis used the diverted and embezzled partnership funds from the 
Orvis-Johnson partnership to acquire the Belding Judgment through All Star, 
LLC. [Record p. 103^22. 
ATTORNEY VICTOR LAWRENCE 
21. Attorney Victor Lawrence is also involved in this conspiracy to defraud 
the Johnsons from their interest in the Orvis-Johnson Partnership. (Triplett Depo. 
Infra, p. 45 attached to Johnson Affidavit below.) [Record p. 103 fl 23] 
22. Victor Lawrence represented DaNell Johnson in important matters, 
including representation of her as a partner to the Orvis-Johnson Partnership 
before the SBA (One of the very judgments acquired by Orvis with Lawrence's 
help). (Exhibit 13, cover page of Deposition of DaNell Johnson in SBA case, 
showing representation by Victor Lawrence attached to Johnson Affidavit below.) 
[Record p. 1031J24] 
23. Victor Lawrence also represented Jamis Johnson in various matters, 
including, at times, in his Utah bar matters and with his obligations to the SBA 
and Lexington Law Firm. [Record p. 103^25] 
24. Discovery has revealed that attorney Victor Lawrence with Orvis used 
information gleaned while representing the Johnsons to take advantage of the 
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Johnsons, and he conspired with Appellee Orvis to obtain the SBA and Belding 
judgments. (Exhibit 6, Triplett Depo, infra, page 45.) [Record p. 103 U 26] 
25. Subsequent information also indicates that Victor Lawrence attempted 
in conspiracy with Orvis to look for and obtain any other judgments against his 
clients to seize, convert, and extinguish the Orvis-Johnson partnership. [Record 
p. 1031J27]. 
ORVIS TAKING MILLIONS OF DOLLARS 
26. Orvis and Lawrence work closely together in Lexington Law Firm, with 
Orvis making all major decisions, and with Orvis sweeping 70% of profits for 
himself from Victor Lawrence's Lexington Law firm, for owning, managing and 
marketing. Orvis is in actuality, the owner of the firm; and the firm is his alter ego; 
and he controls all aspects of the law firm, though he is a non-lawyer. (Exhibit 7, 
Vigil Depo, supra, page 70, and Exhibit 14, Management Agreement between 
Orvis and Lawrence, attached to Johnson Affidavit filed in lower court below.) 
[Record p. 103 U 28] 
27. Mr. Orvis and attorney Lawrence have much to gain from this 
conspiracy. This case involves millions of dollars and it is estimated that Jayson 
Orvis is today personally taking $500,000 to $800,000 monthly from the credit 
repair ventures, at least one third of which belongs to the Johnsons. (Ex. 7, Vigil 
Deposition p. 70, line 6-15) (Lexington web page: lexingtonlaw.com) (Ex. 6, 
Deposition of Tommy Triplett p. 22,1. 14, where Orvis takes in $153,000 in one 
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month several years ago.) and Lexington Law Firms has 75,000 to 150,000 
clients each paying $35 monthly and Orvis takes the lion's portion of this money. 
(Ex. 7, Vigil Deposition supra.), and Victor Lawrence is making, it is estimated, 
more than $60,000 per month and his income jumped radically as soon as the 
lawsuit was filed by Berman, and the profit share cut off and seized from the 
Johnsons and split by attorney Lawrence and Mr. Orvis. [Record p. 103 fl 29. 
ALL STAR, LLC ACTIVE DESPITE "DISSOLVED" STATUS 
28. Within the last three months, it has emerged that All Star, LLC, the 
dissolved Utah LLC is still being actively and fraudulently used despite its 
dissolution and complete expiration. In a case filed in California, home owners 
complain of facts revealing a fraudulent activity by the dissolved LLC and it is 
named as a defendant along with Mark Kemp, its principal. [Record pp. 819 ^ 1] 
A search of judgments in Utah Courts against All Star, LLC reveals that All Star, 
LLC is actively and fraudulently being used continuously though dissolved and 
expired. 
FACTS RELATED TO MOTION TO STRIKE: 
29. Mr. Orvis filed a motion for summary judgment to renew the Belding 
Judgment. [Record p. 29] 
30. Mr. Johnson answered with a memorandum in opposition. [Record 
p.97] 
17 
31. In Reply, Mr. Orvis filed a reply brief [Record p. 459] and an affidavit by 
a William Crawley ("Crawley Affidavit) [Record p. 466] that were wholly irrelevant 
and unresponsive, and were instead a personal attack on Appellant Johnson and 
his family with no apparent relationship to the pending motion for summary 
judgment. (Indeed, Mr. Orvis failed to rebut or respond to any of the issues of law 
or material issues of fact raised by Mr. Johnson, presumably leaving those 
matters resolved in Mr. Johnson's favor.) 
The following are examples of the irrelevance and scandalous nature of the 
reply and the Crawley Affidavit. The Johnsons' minor children, for example, were 
the subject of the Crawley Affidavit and Crawley declared that he had secretly 
conversed with the children soliciting information from them and using their 
unwitting testimony in the affidavit. The Crawley Affidavit states "I [Crawley] had 
numerous telephone and in-person conversations with the children of Mr. 
Johnson." [Crawley Affidavit-Record p. 4691f 11.] Photographs of the Johnson 
residence, for example, were included in the Crawley Affidavit and the tax 
valuation. [Record p. 488.] Crawley declared that Mr. Johnson had been a 
defendant in 93 cases. [Record p 867 fl 4] attaching a printout. This information 
was false and misleading and inflammatory for a host of reasons—Johnson was 
actually a party plaintiff in many cited cases, some of the cited cases did not 
exist, or did not involve Appellant; some cases were duplicated many times, 
some cases duplicated a lapsed tax lien 15-20 times, some cases were suits 
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involving Johnson as a trustee in real property foreclosures and not him 
personally, etc. In short, the information was very misleading but highly 
inflammatory and had no relevance to the pending motion for summary judgment 
or the issues raised regarding the Belding judgment. The Crawley Affidavit was 
blatantly immaterial and irrelevant and simply mean spirited. 
Further, Mr. Orvis had hired an unlicensed private investigator, William 
Crawley, (in violation of Utah law—UCA 53-9-101 et. seq.) to perform the 
investigation and surveillance of Mr. Johnson, the minor children, the residence, 
and to prepare and submit under oath the irrelevant and illegally gathered 
information. 
32. Appellant Johnson moved to strike this scandalous and irrelevant reply 
and illegal Crawley affidavit based on three grounds: i) it was not for the purpose 
to rebut as required by Utah law [Record p. 586]; and it was improper under Rule 
56(e) and 12(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. [Record pp. 587, 588.] 
33. In response to Johnson's Motion to Strike, in the face of the accusation 
of irrelevance and malice raised by Mr. Johnson, Orvis bluntly admitted that the 
malicious reply and affidavit were for no reason other than to accuse Mr. Johnson 
and his family of fraud and for no relevant or responsive purpose related to the 
pending motion for summary judgment. [Record p. 593] 
34. Though Mr. Johnson's Motion to Strike was extensively briefed and 
supported by case law and the Rules, the trial Court denied the Motion to Strike 
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with virtually no opportunity by Appellant to argue it. [Record p. 1114, transcript 
p. 34 L10] 
35. At the hearing, the Trial Court did observe that the Crawley Affidavit 
was irrelevant, saying that"... I struggled with why it [the Crawley Affidavit] was 
submitted" [Record p. 1081 and Transcript of summary judgment argument p. 34 
line 4 et. seq.) and that if the affidavit were submitted for some "equitable" 
purpose that such was not a factor in this matter. [Record p. 1081, Transcript 
p.34,line6.] 
MR. ORVIS AND HIS COUNSEL TOMSIC REFUSE 
TO CORRECT ILLEGAL FALSE AFFIDAVIT 
36. The private investigator engaged by Orvis and counsel Tomsic was not 
licensed, a violation of Utah criminal law. UCA 53-9-101 et seq. [Record p. 
1067] 
37. The private investigator surveilled Mr. Johnson and his home and 
family and spoke covertly with Mr. Johnson's minor children. [Record p. 587] 
38. The unlicensed private investigator provided the illegally obtained 
affidavit in court with Appellee's malicious and irrelevant reply and containing 
false statements. [Record p. 586] 
39. On October 4, 2004, Mr. Johnson wrote Orvis' counsel Tomsic, giving 
Orvis and counsel Tomsic notice that the private investigator was unlicensed, that 
it was also a violation by counsel to hire the investigator, and asking counsel's 
help in rectifying this situation. [Record p. 1062] 
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40. Orvis and counsel Tomsic refused to respond and took no action and 
refused to correct the unlawful act or to correct or retract the unlawful and false 
affidavit or to rectify the violation of the law despite request and notice. [Record 
p.1067] 
41. At the argument on the Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to 
Strike, Orvis and counsel Tomsic argued from and allowed the district court to 
rely on these illegally obtained pleadings although by then Mr. Orvis and counsel 
had received direct notice and request to withdraw said pleadings and inform the 
court. Mr. Orvis and counsel continued to refuse to rectify or correct the illegality 
but continued to rely on them. [Record p. 1067] 
42. Now, Counsel Tomsic has admitted by affidavit, in response to a 
motion for Rule 11 sanctions that the private investigator was in violation of the 
law, but has failed to take any action to correct or rectify this violation or explain 
their inaction or why Orvis and Counsel did not inform the court. [Record p. 1052] 
43. At the hearing on the Motion For Rule 11 Sanctions, Appellant 
countered with a Motion For Contempt because, as yet, Appellant had not been 
able to pay the attorneys fees awarded earlier by the district court for Appellee's 
earlier motion for a protective order (discussed below). 
44. The Court denied the Rule 11 sanctions motion. 
FACTS RELATING TO PROTECTIVE ORDER AND SANCTIONS 
45. Orvis has sued Johnson in five courts—three state and two federal: 
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Third District court cases: Judge T. Hanson, civ.no. 010907449; Judge T. 
Medley, civ. no. 020904919; Judge S. McCleve, civ. no. 050905242; Federal 
Court: Judge Bruce Jenkins, 2:95-CV-838J; Judge Teena Campbell, civ. no. 
1:04CV00087TC. 
46. Mr. Orvis, and then also, Mr. Johnson sought discovery of several 
witnesses, Paul Schwenke, Mark Cummings and Bruce Giffen. [Record p. 635] 
47. Mr. Johnson had learned that Victor Lawrence was departing 
imminently for Greece outside of the reach of this case; and further Mr. Johnson 
had learned that Lawrence's colleague, A. Paul Schwenke, who is a witness to 
Lawrence's and Orvis' fraud against Johnsons, was facing criminal charges 
(possibly involving Lawrence also) and that his trial was originally scheduled for a 
date earlier than scheduled discovery and that Schwenke may also be difficult to 
depose if he were convicted. [Record p. 636] 
48. Further, Mr. Orvis had himself and his counsel previously noticed up 
the depositions of Cummings, and Giffen, for early October 2004 in their federal 
case. [Record p. 1113, transcript p. 5 L. 5-15] 
49. Mr. Orvis then rescheduled the planned deposition dates to postpone 
them beyond the original deposition dates and beyond the alleged departure date 
of Lawrence and beyond the scheduled trial date for Schwenke. [Record p. 1113, 
transcript p. 9 L. 2-7] 
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50. Mr. Johnson noticed up for the two federal cases the depositions of 
Schwenke, and Cummings, and Giffen (and was trying to serve Lawrence) for the 
dates that Mr. Orvis had originally set in early October. [Record 1113, transcript 
p. 6, L 13-18} 
51. Because Mr. Johnson had noticed up the depositions of these 
individuals in the other two federal cases (before Judge Jenkins and Judge 
Campbell) Mr. Johnson, a few days before said deposition dates filed similar 
notices of depositions in this case as well, also set for the proposed dates in 
federal court. [Record 1113, transcript p. 6 L 13-18] 
52. Mr. Orvis moved for a protective Order here based on too short a 
notice. [Record p. 756] 
53. The District Court granted Mr. Orvis' motion, and, because of the short 
notice in this case, the court imposed monetary sanctions of attorney's fees 
against Appellant. [Record p. 810] 
54. Though the notices of deposition in this case were short, they actually 
were the same dates in notices given to Mr. Orvis approximately 10 days earlier 
in the two other federal cases. The parties were the same, and the dates were 
the same. And there was concern that witnesses were fleeing. [Record p. 1113, 
transcript p. 6 L 13-18, p. 9 L. 1-7] 
55. Appellant explained to the District Court, that there was a need for a 
speedy setting because of the concerns about lost testimony, and also that the 
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dates set in this case, were actually the same dates as set much earlier in the 
federal cases. [Record p. 1113, transcript p. 6 L. 13-18, p. 9 L. 1-7] 
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A. Introduction. 
The district court granted Appellee Orvis' motion for summary judgment to 
extend and renew the Belding judgment that he had purchased. In granting 
summary judgment, the district court ruled on only one issue, the voidability of the 
assignment of the judgment by a dissolved LLC, (Orvis had acquired the 
judgment by using a dissolved LLC as a straw man and Appellant had argued 
that it lacked capacity.) In granting summary judgment on this single issue, the 
district court had to ignore numerous genuine material issues of fact, any of which 
would defeat Orvis' complaint. These issues were duly raised extensively, and 
were well documented. The district court erred in ignoring these issues. 
B. Genuine issues of material facts exist precluding summary judgment as a 
matter of law. 
There are several genuine issues of material fact, and the standard for 
granting summary judgment are well established, and the facts must be viewed in 
the light most favorable to Appellant. This the district court did not do. Those 
genuine issues of material fact are: 
(1). Genuine issue of material fact #1: The Belding judgment in the hands 
of Mr. Orvis is void or unenforceable as an instrumentality to accomplish an evil 
conspiracy by Mr. Orvis and attorney Victor Lawrence for substantial gains by 
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extinguishing Johnson's partnership interest in the credit repair business between 
Mr. Orvis and the Johnsons and to mask and facilitate ongoing fraud. The 
conspiracy was also a breach of Mr. Orvis' partnership fiduciary duty to Mr. 
Johnson and Mr. Lawrence's attorney client fiduciary duty to the Johnsons. 
Orvis and Appellant and his wife, are partners in a highly profitable credit 
repair business. The partnership is extensively documented and has a course of 
performance of many years. The Johnsons' profit share was $34,000 per month 
just prior to the purchase of this judgment. Orvis was misappropriating and miss-
accounting profit share to the Johnsons. Utah attorney, Victor Lawrence, was the 
attorney for the Johnsons in the partnership and the SBA judgment and had 
inside knowledge, and also was attorney for Orvis and the partnership. Orvis and 
Lawrence conspired to acquire the judgment and take the Johnsons' profit share, 
and extinguish their partnership and split the profits. Orvis purchased the Belding 
judgment to aid in that purpose and hide his fraud. These acts by Orvis and 
Lawrence violate partner and attorney fiduciary duty to the Johnsons and are 
fraudulent. The acquisition and enforcement of the judgment is a violation of 
public policy, is fraudulent, and equity won't support it and the judgment is void in 
the hands of Orvis. 
(2). Genuine issue of material fact #2: The judgment is invalid in the hands 
of Mr. Orvis because it is property of the partnership purchased with partnership 
assets. 
Orvis purchased the Belding judgment with funds misappropriated from the 
Orvis-Johnson partnership. Thus, Orvis would not own the Belding judgment. 
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The Orvis-Johnson partnership, whose money was misappropriated and used to 
buy the judgment would be the actual owner of this judgment. And thus Orvis is 
the wrong party in interest to have brought this lawsuit. His complaint must be 
dismissed. And the partnership could not now bring a new complaint because 
the judgment is otherwise expired. 
(3). Genuine issue of material fact #3: The judgment should be satisfied by 
offset against the million plus dollars of profit share unlawfully withheld by Mr. 
Orvis from the Johnsons. 
At the time that Orvis purchased the judgment, he commenced withholding 
the profit share he divided with the Johnsons. The amount of profit share the 
Johnsons had been receiving for many months was approximately $34,000 per 
month. The total amount withheld by Orvis to date exceeds $1.5 Million (and is 
likely much higher because of the misappropriation) That amount is an offset to 
the Belding judgment and completely satisfies the Belding judgment. 
C. The district court erred in finding the expired status of the limited liability 
company at the time it was the grantee of the judgment created only a voidable 
transaction rather than a void one. 
Orvis used the straw man All Star, LLC to conceal his identity when he first 
acquired the Belding judgment. It was at the time administratively dissolved 
under Utah law and lacked the capacity to conduct any business but could only 
engage in activity to wind up its affairs. Thus it had no capacity to receive the 
assignment of the Belding judgment or to re-assign it 24 hours later to Orvis. For 
two years, Orvis could have cured the dissolved status by renewing the LLC with 
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the State but he failed to do so. The LLC cannot now be reinstated. Orvis, and 
the district court in granting summary judgment, relied on the Miller case (supra) 
for the proposition that a contract entered into by a dissolved LLC is voidable and 
not void. Miller says rather that a dissolved corporation, as the enforcing party of 
a contract, entered into while dissolved, cannot enforce the contract. It is void as 
to it. But there is an option for the deceived party to void or not. Further, Orvis 
approaches this with unclean hands since his purpose in acquiring the judgment 
was fraudulent. And even if he successfully acquired the judgment, Appellant's 
defenses are still in force. 
D. The district court erred in failing to grant Appellant's Motion To Strike the 
Crawley Affidavit and the offending portions of the Reply Memorandum of 
Appellee which were wholly irrelevant and were filed to malign, and to intimidate 
Appellant and his family, and filed with actual malice as stated; and the District 
Court erred in failing to award to Appellant Rule 11 Sanctions for filing the 
irrelevant and malicious Crawley Affidavit, and for using an unlicensed private 
investigator, in violation of Utah law, to obtain the affidavit; and for failing to alert 
the court of the fact and failing and refusing to take any steps to rectify said 
problems once notice was provided. 
Orvis filed the Crawley Affidavit and related Reply. It was not responsive. 
It was malicious and maligned. Appellant moved to strike. In response to the 
strike motion, Orvis actually stated that the offending affidavit and reply were 
submitted for an irrelevant and a malicious purpose. Judge Medley denied the 
motion to strike. 
Appellant gave written notice to Orvis and counsel Tomsic that they had 
engaged an unlicensed private detective in violation of Utah law, and that he had 
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spoken covertly with the minor children of Appellant. Appellant requested that 
they withdraw the motion and rectify this matter. Orvis refused and argued from 
the offending pleadings and later admitted fault. Appellant filed a Rule 11 
sanctions motion against Orvis and counsel Tomsic, citing this and the malicious 
and irrelevant pleadings and cited other violations in the other four cases filed by 
Orvis against Appellant. The district court abused its discretion when it denied 
Appellant's motion for Rule 11 sanctions. 
E. The District Court erred in awarding Appellee Orvis monetary sanctions 
when granting the protective order. 
The district court granted Orvis' motion for protective order as to 
Appellant's short notice of depositions of three witnesses. The district court 
awarded Orvis attorney's fees against Appellant. Appellant however had not 
surprised or inconvenienced Orvis because the dates set were actually the same 
dates set ten days earlier in two of the other cases (of the five) filed by Orvis 
against Appellant. These dates were originally chosen by Orvis. And Johnson 
feared the loss of witnesses and testimony unless he moved fast. Note that the 
district court granted these sanctions against Appellant with not even oral 
argument though Appellant was arguably acting properly, and yet the district 
court refused to strike a scandalous and irrelevant motion by Orvis and refused 
Rule 11 sanctions for Orvis' and counsel's willful breaking of the law. There is a 
disparity in fairness here. 
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VII. ARGUMENT 
A. Introduction 
Appellee, Jayson Orvis, (plaintiff below), purchased the Belding Judgment, 
(one of two judgments arising from a failed business venture in the late 80's and 
early 90's against Appellant Johnson and purchased by Orvis against Appellant) 
to use in a conspiracy to extinguish Appellant's interest in the parties' credit repair 
business and to conceal misappropriation of profit share by Mr. Orvis. The 
Belding judgment was old and ready to expire, so Mr. Orvis brought the complaint 
below against Appellant to renew and extend the judgment before it expired. 
Appellant Johnson in answering the Orvis complaint mounted several defenses to 
the Orvis complaint including the following: (1) Mr. Orvis could not seek an 
extension of the judgment because the judgment is void in the hands of Mr. Orvis 
because the judgment was the subject matter of fraud, conspiracy to defraud, 
breach of fiduciary duties by Johnson's lawyer, Victor Lawrence, and Johnson's 
partner, Jayson Orvis; (2) The assignment of the judgment was defective 
because the straw man assignee, a defunct limited liability company called All 
Star Financial, LLC, ("All Star, LLC") put up by Mr. Orvis to initially receive the 
assignment, was an expired limited liability company without legal capacity to 
receive the assignment, or the legal capacity to, one day later, re-assign it to 
Orvis; (3) The judgment was not owned by Orvis but was, in actuality, the 
property of the Johnson-Orvis partnership because Mr. Orvis used partnership 
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funds, misappropriated from the partnership, to purchase it; and (4) the judgment 
had been fully satisfied because Appellee Orvis had withheld at least $1.5 Million 
of Appellant's profit share from the Johnson-Orvis partnership since wrongly 
acquiring the judgment. 
Mr. Orvis' reply to Appellant Johnson's Memorandum and Affidavit 
opposing summary judgment entirely failed to respond to or rebut any of the 
issues of law raised by Appellant, except one—the voidability of the assignment 
issue. 
The court below erred by ignoring all the issues raised by the defense and 
granted Appellee Orvis' motion for summary judgment [Record p. 807] on the 
sole ground that the assignments to and from the expired LLC were valid 
because the status of the assignee, All Star, LLC, as a dissolved limited liability 
company without capacity, only made the assignment voidable and not void. The 
issue for the validity of the assignment is discussed under Section III below. The 
defenses as set forth above raised genuine and material factual issues that must 
be tried, thus, precluding summary judgment, as a matter of law. Indeed, every 
one of the defenses raised is material because the outcome of this case is 
affected by a decision on any one of those issues. Beginning with defense #1 
above, if Appellant Johnson were to prove at the trial of this case that Appellee 
Orvis and attorney Victor Lawrence indeed conspired to defraud him by 
purchasing the Belding judgment and Mr. Orivs and Mr. Lawrence actually 
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defrauded Appellant Johnson, and they did so in breach of their fiduciary duties 
(as lawyer and partner, respectively), the court of equity will certainly vitiate, 
rather than enforce, the judgment as fruit of the poisonous tree. Similarly, the 
outcome is different if at the trial Appellant Johnson was able to establish the 
Appellee Orvis used partnership funds to purchase the judgment. If Mr. Johnson 
does so prove the above, the judgment legally belongs to the partnership and not 
to Appellee Orvis. If the judgment is partnership property, then it is the 
partnership and not Mr. Orvis that should be bringing this case—and because the 
judgment is otherwise expired, it would be too late for an entirely different entity to 
file this complaint to extend this judgment. Moreover, apart from establishing that 
the judgment is partnership property, Appellant can well establish that Mr. Orvis 
has unlawfully withheld over $1.5 million in profit share, which would be more 
than sufficient to completely offset the payment of the judgment. Since any one 
of the three defenses above would affect the outcome of this case, and each 
issue raises genuine and material factual issues, summary judgment should have 
been denied. Therefore, the summary judgment must be reversed and this 
matter remanded to the district court for a trial of the excluded genuine issues of 
material fact. 
B. Genuine issues of material facts exist precluding 
summary judgment as a matter of law 
It is axiomatic that "[sjummary judgment is appropriate only when no 
genuine issue of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
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as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 
231, 235 (Utah 1993). (Emphasis added). Because summary judgment is a 
question of law, this court accords no deference to the district court's grant of 
summary judgment. See Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 50 (Utah 1996). 
Furthermore, "in reviewing a grant of summary judgment,.. .the facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom [must be viewed] in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party." Id. at 47 (emphasis added). Under this 
standard, the district court erred in granting summary judgment while genuine 
issues of material facts were raised by Appellant Johnson, the non-moving party. 
(1). Genuine issue of material fact #1: The Belding 
judgment in the hands of Mr. Orvis is void or 
unenforceable as an instrumentality to accomplish an 
evil conspiracy by Mr. Orvis and attorney Victor 
Lawrence for substantial gains by extinguishing 
Johnson's partnership interest in the credit repair 
business between Mr. Orvis and the Johnsons and to 
mask and facilitate ongoing fraud. The conspiracy was 
also a breach of Mr. Orvis' partnership fiduciary duty to 
Mr. Johnson and Mr. Lawrence's attorney client fiduciary 
duty to the Johnsons. 
The Answer and Counterclaim [Record pp.9-18] sets forth this issue with 
particularity. In the Answer, Mr. Johnson alleged as an Eighth Defense [Record 
p. 11] that "[t]he acquisition of the judgments [including the Belding judgment] by 
Plaintiff is for the purpose of masking fraud and the violation of fiduciary duty and 
involves a law firm and a defense against said law firm, and such acquisition of 
the judgment and its use thereby is a violation of public policy." (Emphasis 
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added.) Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse, 980 P.2d 208,1999 UT 
49, 369 Utah Adv. Rep. 36 (Utah 1999). The supporting facts of the existence of 
the credit repair partnership and partner fiduciary duties between Mr. Orvis and 
the Johnsons were alleged with clarity in paragraphs 2 through 5 [Record, p. 12) 
and paragraphs 6 through 9 (Record p. 13] and throughout subsequent pleadings 
and oral arguments. The supporting facts as to attorney Mr. Victor Lawrence's 
role as attorney, owing fiduciary duties to the partnership and the Johnsons were 
set forth with clarity in paragraphs 12 (Record p.13) and throughout subsequent 
pleadings and oral arguments. Attorney Lawrence represented Mrs. DaNell 
Johnson (among other matters) at the SBA post judgment proceedings where 
she elaborated on her partnership with Mr. Orvis. Attorney Lawrence learned 
during his representation that the SBA would take pennies on the dollar to settle 
the judgment against Mr. Johnson. Instead of aiding his client, attorney 
Lawrence conspired with Orvis to purchase the judgment and use it with the 
Belding judgment to attempt to extinguish Johnsons' interest in the highly 
profitable credit repair business. Paragraph 13 and 16 [Record p. 13 and 14]. 
As their attorney, Victor Lawrence owed the Johnsons a fiduciary duty of 
complete loyalty and that duty means that he "must never use [his] position of 
trust to take advantage of his client's confidences for [himself] or for other 
parties." Walter v. Wiley, Rein& Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1290 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996) ["In all relationships with clients, attorneys are required to exercise 
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impeccable honesty, fair dealing and fidelity." (emphasis added)] The court of 
appeal in Walter v. Stewart also emphasized the Kilpatrick ruling and held that 
"[attorneys are 'not permitted to take advantage of [theirl position or superior 
knowledge to impose upon [clients]; nor to conceal facts or law, nor in any way 
deceive fclientsl without being held responsible therefor.' (Emphasis added.) 
Civil conspiracy is a recognized cause of action in Utah. Tanner v. Carter, 
20 P.3d 332, 2001 UT 18 (Utah 02/23/2001). Here an attorney and a partner 
conspired against their clients for substantial gain at their expense, and to hide 
preceding and ongoing fraud against them, and to extinguish and convert the 
Johnsons' partnership interest. At the time of the conspiracy, the Johnsons were 
receiving $34,000.00 per month in profit share. Their attorney and their partner 
conspired to purchase judgments against Mr. Johnson and use the threat of the 
execution and other force of law to i) compel the Johnsons to walk away from 
$34,000.00 a month (and increasing) in profit share, ii) to divide that profit share 
between themselves, (Orvis and Lawrence) and iii) to hide and offensively stop 
an audit and accounting that would reveal prior and on-going fraud in accounting 
for and allocation of profit share. As soon as the judgments were purchased, 
attorney Dan Berman, who represents both Victor Lawrence and Jayson Orvis, 
summoned Mr. Johnson over to his office where Mr. Johnson was informed that 
Mr. Orvis and Mr. Lawrence had acquired the judgments; that Mr. Johnson must 
abandon his partnership; that suit had been filed against Johnson; and that it 
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would cost Mr. Johnson some $300,000 to defend himself and settlement would 
be advisable. 
The facts of the conspiracy, the breach of lawyer and partner fiduciary 
duties and fraud have been articulated with particularity and the district court was 
duty bound to present the issues to a trier of fact. The district court's failure to do 
so is reversible error that can only be corrected for this court to reverse the 
summary judgment and remand this case for trial. 
(2). Genuine issue of material fact #2: The judgment 
is invalid in the hands of Mr. Orvis because it is property 
of the partnership purchased with partnership assets. 
This issue was raised in the Answer and Counterclaim fl 21 [Record p. 15], 
the Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment and the 
affidavit in support of the opposition memorandum and in oral argument and 
subsequent pleadings. A finding by a trier of fact that indeed Mr. Orvis used 
partnership funds to purchase the judgments and that the judgments legally 
belong to and are assets of the partnership would clearly vitiate Mr. Orvis' claim 
of ownership and entitlement to seek an extension of the judgment. If the 
judgment is partnership property, all the partners have to agree to seek extension 
and since Mr. Johnson would not have given his consent, the action to seek an 
extension of the judgment would not have been properly or timely brought. 
Moreover, time to file such an action by the true owner, the partnership, has run 
and the partnership is forever barred from instituting such an action. 
35 
(3). Genuine issue of material fact #3: The 
judgment should be satisfied by offset against the million 
plus dollars of profit share unlawfully withheld bv Mr. 
Orvis from the Johnsons. 
Mr. Orvis in all the law suits he has instituted against the Johnsons, (five so 
far), has never denied that the credit repair business was paying up to $34,000 a 
month profit share to the Johnsons, and the amount of profit share has been on 
the increase. (Indeed, the amount misappropriated is more likely in the range of 
$5 Million.) Mr. Orvis cannot deny that as soon as he purchased the judgments 
against Mr. Johnson in August, 2001, Mr. Orvis unlawfully ceased making the 
monthly profit share payments of $34,000 to the Johnsons. Simple mathematics 
confirm that Mr. Orvis has unlawfully withheld at a minimum over $1.5 million of 
Johnsons' profit share. If Mr. Orvis is allowed to offset the Belding judgment 
against the Johnson's unlawfully withheld profit share that is more than sufficient 
funds to completely satisfy the judgment. 
C. The district court erred in finding the expired status of the 
limited liability company at the time it was the grantee of 
the judgment created only a voidable transaction rather 
than a void one. 
On July 3, 2001, All Star Financial LLC, ("All Star, LLC") was 
administratively dissolved by the State of Utah, Department of Commerce. Some 
50 days later, while All Star, LLC was in its dissolved status, Orvis uses All Star 
Financial, LLC, as a front organization to acquire the Belding judgment, (and also 
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the SBA judgment) and thus Belding, on August 23, 2001 assigned the judgment 
to the dissolved All Star, LLC. The next day, on August 24, 2001, All Star, LLC 
turned around and assigned the judgment to Orvis. 
These two assignments of judgment are problematic because All Star, LLC 
lacked the capacity and power to effect these transactions because it was 
dissolved. The assignments to All Star, LLC and from All Star, LLC are void. 
Indeed, within two years of its dissolution, this problem might possibly have 
been cured by Orvis but no one has ever taken any action to reinstate All Star 
Financial, LLC. Utah Code 48-2c-1208 states: 
Reinstatement following administrative dissolution. 
(1) A company dissolved under Section 48-2c-1207 may apply to the 
division for reinstatement within two years after the effective date of 
dissolution... [Emphasis added.] 
The two year reinstatement period has run out. 
An LLC that is dissolved has limited powers while in a dissolved status. 
UCA 48-2c-1203. Effect of dissolution. 
(1) A dissolved company continues its existence but may not carry on 
any business or activities except as appropriate to wind up and liquidate its 
business and affairs. [Emphasis added.] 
Further, a dissolved LLC has strictly limited powers which, may only be used for 
winding up. 
UCA 48-2c-1302. Powers of company in winding up. 
A dissolved company in winding up has all powers of a company that 
is not dissolved but those powers may be used only for the purpose of 
37 
winding up and not for the carrying on of any business or activity other 
than that necessary for winding up. [Emphasis added.] 
So here is what is left. 
All Star, LLC was dissolved. As a dissolved LLC, it did not have power to act 
unless action was strictly for winding up. Buying and selling a judgment for Orvis 
was not winding up. If that activity was not winding up, All Star, LLC did not have 
the ability to either buy or assign the judgment to Orvis. Perhaps All Star, LLC 
could have reinstated and Orvis could have tried to cure the dissolved status. It 
had two years to do that. No one has ever taken that step. Two years have 
passed. When Orvis learned of his mistake, he had the SBA try to cure this 
problem by conveying the SBA judgment directly to him since All Star, LLC was 
dead. But here, no only is All Star, LLC dead, the Belding judgment is otherwise 
expired so Orvis cannot go directly to Belding to have that judgment reconveyed 
to him directly. 
In this case, Orvis claims to want to renew and extend the Belding 
judgment. It would appear that All Star, LLC's purchase of the judgment is void 
(as it did not have the authority or capacity to make the purchase) and its 
assignment to Orvis is void as All Star, LLC did not have the authority or capacity 
to assign the judgment, either. If Orvis does not validly possess the judgment, 
then Orvis cannot sue to renew a judgment he does not own, and this case must 
be dismissed. 
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Appellee Orvis argued that the two assignments of judgment were 
"voidable" and not automatically void. Appellee cites Miller v. Celebration Mining 
Co. 29 P. 3d 1231 (Utah 2001) for this proposition. The district court relied on 
that case. There are problems with this argument. First, the Miller case does not 
stand for the proposition for which it is cited by Appellee Orvis. In Miller the 
Celebration group had contracted with a dissolved corporation and indeed Miller 
may be cited for the proposition that corporations, once lapsed, lack capacity to 
contract or enforce contracts. And this holding of Miller actually supports 
Appellant Johnson's position, not Appellee's. Thus by analogy to Miller, the 
enforcing party, Orvis (alter ego with All Star, LLC) in this instance, is like the 
enforcing party in Miller—an individual and former president trying to enforce a 
contract entered into by his dissolved corporation. The enforcer lost and could 
not enforce because his corporation was dissolved—like Orvis, the enforcing 
party here. And the party disputing the enforcement of the contract, Appellant 
here, is in that stance of the Celebration Mining group who did not want to have 
the contract enforced, and were allowed in the Miller case to repudiate and void 
the contract. The one clear point of the Miller decision is that the impaired, 
dissolved corporation or individual associated with it does not have any ability to 
enforce a contract. 
Further for this proposition that lapsed LLC's haven't contracting power, 
see cases White v. Dvorak 896 P.2d 85 Wash.App. Div. 1,1995 and Brendv. 
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Dome Development, Ltd. 418 N.W.2d 610 N.D.,1988. The prevailing position is 
that dissolved and impaired business entities lack capacity to contract. This is 
hornbook law. See 19 Am Jur 2d, New Contracts and Transactions § 2891 "In 
the absence of any statute continuing its existence, a corporation after its 
dissolution or of the expiration or forfeiture of its charter cannot enter into new 
contracts or further transact business." 
In Murphy v. Crosland 886 P2d 74 (Utah App1994) the Supreme Court 
examined extensively the meaning of Utah statutes relating to suspension and 
dissolution and expiration. The Court states that there are four periods in the life 
of a business entity: pre-incorporation, incorporation, dissolution and expiration. 
The Court notes that the legislature must have intended some change in legal 
rights when an LLC goes into dissolved status and then after two years ceases 
existence. These statutory changes in an LLC's life would have no meaning if an 
LLC or its alter egos and would be manipulators could continue business as 
though nothing has occurred. During 2 years of dissolution it lacked capacity but 
that could have been cured. After two years the entity may not be brought back 
from inactivity to full function. It has ceased to exist. And it may not simply 
declare its contracts entered into when it lacked capacity, to be fully enforceable 
while it has continued its descent into non-existence. Appellee Orvis would use 
All Star, LLC to contract and as the filter through which he runs the judgment and 
then Orvis would continue to aggressively pursue the judgment demanding his 
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pound of flesh as though All Star, LLC were in full good standing, without any 
consequence from indifference to state law, or to its lack of good standing and 
even its non-existence under state law. 
Second, even assuming that a contract (the "assignment") of a dissolved 
LLC may be kept from being voided, there must be the assent of the parties to 
the continued viability of the assignments. Miller indicates that the Celebration 
group (the parties in Miller not affiliated with the dissolved corporation, who 
successfully resisted enforcement) had an "option" to decide what to do— 
acquiesce to enforcement or declare the contract void. Thus, Miller may be seen 
to say that the parties to these types of contracts must assent to the contract's 
continued enforcement. The first question is who are the parties to the void 
assignments that must be heard from to assure the court that the assignment 
should continue in existence? In the first assignment, from PJ's Trucking to All-
Star, LLC, the parties to this assignment are PJ's Trucking and All Star, LLC. 
Nowhere is there evidence below, presented by Appellee Orvis, that these two, 
PJ's and All Star, LLC, have had any actual assent with regard to the non-
voidability of this assignment from PJ's to All Star, LLC. The second assignment 
that must be ratified is from All Star, LLC to Orvis. Herein lies a sub-question. Is 
not the assignment that must be ratified actually between All Star, LLC and the 
Orvis-Johnson partnership—the actual owner of the assignment if 
misappropriated partnership funds were used. While Orvis' assent to the ultra 
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vires assignment may be inferred, (but under Miller is irrelevant) there is no 
evidence that there is assent to the non-voidability of the assignment by All Star, 
LLC, other than Appellee Orvis' assumption that this is the case. Certainly there 
is no assent to this by the Orvis-Johnson partnership. At a minimum, the district 
court must have had evidence of these assents to non-voidability before granting 
summary judgment. If the assignments are voidable, not void, depending on the 
agreement of the parties to the two assignments, then summary judgment was 
still improper without evidence of the actual assent and agreement of the various 
parties to the continued validity of the various assignments of the Belding 
judgment. 
There are further considerations here which are equitable defenses that 
would have prevented summary judgment. Reviving a void assignment from the 
corpse of a dissolved LLC is an equitable remedy, not one sounding in law. The 
law, UCA 48-2C-1203 and 1208 clearly states that All Star, LLC hasn't the 
capacity to deal in these assignments. Equity, however, allows the assignments 
to escape the harsh thrust of the law voiding them, if the parties thereto agree 
that assignments be kept in force. To keep the assignments alive, equity must 
step in. There is unequivocal evidence below that these assignment 
machinations were crafted by Orvis to defraud and oppress and as part of a 
conspiracy—in short evidence of unclean hands— which is a defense to an 
equitable remedy. Consider even Orvis' scheme of using the ruse of a straw man 
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LLC rather than negotiate outright with Belding and/or the SBA, and all the while 
intending within 24 hours to flip the judgment to himself, the real party in interest. 
Further, there is evidence of laches here—another equitable defense. Appellee 
Orvis engaged his alter ego LLC when it had already been dissolved for 1 V2 
months. And then for two years, even when aggressively pursuing this lawsuit, 
neither Orvis nor All Star, LLC, took the simple steps of renewing this LLC, 
ultimately allowing it to completely expire. Appellee is guilty of laches. Note also, 
there is evidence in the record below [Record p 818-886] learned after the grant 
of summary judgment, that All Star, LLC and its principals continue to ignore Utah 
law, doing transactions though entirely expired and have defrauded a California 
homeowner; and also have defrauded the federal government (SBA) with the 
same ruse where Orvis put up the expired LLC to acquire an SBA judgment and 
within 24 hours flipped it to himself. That situation with the SBA is even more 
pernicious because Orvis and attorney Lawrence actually had prior dealings with 
the SBA for Jamis Johnson and DaNell Johnson and obviously wanted to conceal 
their identity from the SBA. These events recorded without opposition, in the 
Record below, also militate against allowing Orvis and All Star, LLC to simply 
assert that they desire to keep in force an assignment that is arguably fraudulent. 
For the above reasons, this Court should reverse the district court's finding that 
the two assignments of the Belding judgment are in force because they are 
merely voidable not void. 
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Obviously, if the assignments are not void, Orvis must still have to hold 
them in trust for the Orvis-Johnson partnership; the judgment may have been 
satisfied by offset, the judgment may be a fraud on the Johnsons, but 
nonetheless the assignments should be void. 
D. The district court erred in failing to grant Appellant's Motion To 
Strike the Crawley Affidavit and the offending portions of the 
Reply Memorandum of Appellee which were wholly irrelevant 
and were filed to malign, and to intimidate Appellant and his 
family, and filed with actual malice as stated; and the District 
Court erred in failing to award to Appellant Rule 11 Sanctions 
for filing the irrelevant and malicious Crawley Affidavit, and for 
using an unlicensed private investigator, in violation of Utah 
law, to obtain the affidavit; and for failing to alert the court of 
the fact and failing and refusing to take any steps to rectify 
said problems once notice was provided. 
(1) Motion To Strike 
Responding to Orvis' Motion For Summary Judgment, Appellant Johnson 
filed his opposing memorandum and affidavit, raising therein material issues of 
fact and law. In his Reply, Appellee Orvis submitted the Crawley Affidavit. It was 
wholly irrelevant. It was the sort of personal attack, not responding to any issue 
of law, that would seem to be typically abhorred by the legal profession and 
courts alike. It would turn out that Appellee and his counsel Tomsic engaged an 
unlicensed private investigator to collect this information [Record p. 958] and 
converse with minor children, [Record p. 588] in violation of Utah law. Appellant 
properly and justly moved to strike this Reply and Crawley affidavit citing three 
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basis in support. The affidavit was unresponsive to the prior pleading as required 
of a reply memorandum. (Appellant cited Record p. 586). It was also 
inappropriate under Rules 56(e) and 12(f) as scandalous, and immaterial. And it 
was so clearly irrelevant that it was not justified under any basis. 
Then Orvis and his counsel Tomsic, in his opposition memorandum to the 
motion to strike, actually admitted that the Crawley affidavit was submitted for a 
malicious and irrelevant purpose. Appellee and counsel stated: "While the facts 
ascertained by Mr. Crawley will be critical to any attempt by Mr. Orvis to collect on 
his judgment, they serve here to belie any notion forwarded by Mr. Johnson that 
he is an innocent party." [Record p. 593] They further state: "[Johnsons] have 
lived a very comfortable lifestyle for years that has been directly funded by Mr. 
Johnson's fraud and deceit and to the detriment of Mr. Johnson's many 
creditors." [Record p. 593] 
Given the clear irrelevant and admittedly malicious nature of the Crawley 
affidavit, the District Court erred in not granting Appellant's Motion To Strike. 
(2) Rule 11 Sanctions 
Appellant sought Rule 11 Sanctions against Appellee and his counsel for 
three reasons: Appellee Orvis submitted the irrelevant and malicious Crawley 
Affidavit for an improper purpose, and maligned Appellant in both the Crawley 
Affidavit and in the Reply to the Motion To Strike; Appellee Orvis and counsel 
engaged an unlicensed private investigator to perform a surveillance of 
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Appellant's home, allowing him to extract evidence from the minor children of 
Appellant [Record p. 588] to collect information for and submit the malicious 
Crawley Affidavit; and after notice of the illegality and a request for assistance in 
rectifying this problem, [Record p. 1017] Appellee and counsel willfully refused to 
rectify this situation, refused to withdraw the offending pleadings, and continued 
to rely on the testimony of the illegal unlicensed investigator and even argued 
before the Court with the offending pleadings in place without informing the Court 
of the status of the information. 
It appears that the offending material was submitted to intimidate, harass, 
inflame and malign, and in fact, it did offend and intimidate not only Appellant but 
Appellant's wife, DaNell Johnson who submitted an affidavit. [Record p. 878] It 
was oppressive and intended to be so. 
Note also that Orvis and counsel Tomsic have engaged in a pattern of bad 
and sanctionable acts in related cases and Appellant set these out in the moving 
pleadings. These allegations were not denied by Appellee Orvis or Counsel 
Tomsic. This is relevant because Rule 11 considers what measure of sanctions 
are necessary to stop such sanctionable acts. Because Appellant is pro se and 
has little funds to engage counsel, Orvis and his counsel Tomsic have 
aggressively stretched and crossed the bounds of acceptable contact in this and 
other cases—seemingly with impunity. 
The trial Court erred in not granting Rule 11 sanctions against Appellee 
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and Appellee's counsel. This court is respectfully requested to impose Rule 11 
sanctions and to remand to the district court to find the amount of monetary 
sanctions to impose. 
E. The District Court erred in awarding Appellee Orvis monetary 
sanctions when granting the protective order. 
The district court granted monetary sanctions against Appellant for 
providing too short a notice for depositions of three persons: Paul Schwenke, 
Mark Cummings, and Bruce Giffen. The depositions of all three of these persons 
were noticed up already by Orvis in two other cases, for the same date that notice 
was provided in the district courts case. More than ten days notice had in 
actuality been provided, by virtue of the notice in the other cases. Appellant 
Johnson had reason to fear the loss of testimony by the imminent departure of 
Victor Lawrence and by the criminal trial (later continued) of Paul Schwenke. 
The district court erred in imposing monetary sanctions for these notices 
because Appellant had valid basis to fear the loss of testimony and the actual 
dates given were already given in other courts, and Appellant provided, at the 
hearing on this matter, adequate support for his actions to the district court of the 
basis for the deposition notices in this court. [Record, p. 1113 Transcript p. 6] 
It should be noted that the district court granted sanctions against Appellant 
with virtually a one line request in the Orvis motion for protective order and no 
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oral argument therefor, but the same court refused sanctions against Orvis and 
counsel despite an admission to violating the law and a refusal after request and 
notice to rectify that violation. The sanctions cause a significant financial burden 
on Appellant. The imposition of monetary sanctions should be reversed. 
XI. CONCLUSION 
While one may purchase a judgment against another and enforce it, there 
are constraints and legitimate defenses that may be asserted. The judgment 
purchaser who seeks strict and sometimes onerous enforcement lives by the 
sword but must be prepared to die by it, as well. 
It should be starkly obvious that all the machinations by Orvis and his 
counsel are for a purpose of defending against and concealing fraud, 
embezzlement and betrayal. 
The district court below, in very few hearings, granted summary judgment 
against Appellant on only one issue, ignoring the entirety of genuine and 
exceptionally well documented material issues of fact; the district court granted 
sanctions against Appellant for noticing up depositions; the district court denied 
Appellant's motion to strike and Motion for Rule 11 sanctions, for Orvis' agent, an 
unlicensed private detective, to surveil the minor children of Appellant, and, with 
impunity, to violate criminal law, and to file, with clear malice, pleadings that are 
irrelevant yet harmful. 
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Appellant is pro se. Orvis has consistently argued (and will likely again 
argue in his reply to this brief) that Appellant is a disgraced person not worthy to 
withstand the lower court's summary dismissal. Orvis attacks Appellant 
personally, but has not dealt directly with the facts and law set out below and 
here. Orvis cannot deny that Victor Lawrence represented each of the Johnsons, 
and him, and the partnership. Orvis cannot deny that his own employee has 
testified that Orvis and attorney Lawrence conspired to buy judgments against the 
Johnsons. Orvis cannot deny that he was allocating profit share with the 
Johnsons and ceased it immediately upon acquiring the judgments here. Orvis 
cannot deny the breach of partnership fiduciary duty and, indeed, of attorney 
fiduciary duty. Orvis cannot deny that his own employee testified that he set up 
secret companies to receive and siphon money from the Orvis-Johnson 
partnership, and that he deliberately misstated partnership accounting. 
Indeed, if the allegations documented in the court below and in this brief, 
regarding the actions of Orvis and attorney Lawrence are true, these claims also 
constitute a crime. Yet all this is seemingly ignored below. Appellant has more 
than once asked "Where is fairness?". Is it possible to obtain based solely on the 
law or does expensive legal support overwhelm a fair adjudication? 
Appellant seeks for the Court of Appeals to reverse the district court's grant 
of summary judgment and send the case back down so the issues of material fact 
may go to a trier of fact. 
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For the reasons set forth above, Appellant respectfully asks the honorable 
Court of Appeals for the following relief: 
1. That the summary judgment be reversed and this case remanded to the 
district court for the reasons argued; 
2. That the material issues of fact raised herein be found to have sufficient 
merit and materiality to be addressed by the trier of fact below; 
3. That the denial of the motion to strike be reversed and the offending 
pleadings be struck; 
4. That the Rule 11 sanctions be imposed or that the district court be 
required to review the matter again based on the illegality of the private detective 
and the maliciousness of the pleadings; and 
5. That the award of attorney's fees in connection with the protective order 
be rescinded. 
Appellant expresses his gratitude to this Court of Appeals for its 
consideration of this Brief of Appellant. 
DATED this I > T day of May, 2005 
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